Black codes were restrictive laws designed to limit the freedom of African Americans and ensure their availability as a cheap labor force after slavery was abolished during the Civil War. Under black codes, many states required Black people to sign yearly labor contracts; if they refused, they risked being arrested, fined and forced into unpaid labor.
Even as former enslaved people fought to assert their independence and gain economic autonomy during the earliest years of Reconstruction. While the codes granted certain freedoms to African Americans—including the right to buy and own property, marry, make contracts and testify in court (only in cases involving people of their own race)—their primary purpose was to restrict Black peoples’ labor and activity. Black people who broke labor contracts were subject to arrest, beating and forced labor, and apprenticeship laws forced many minors into unpaid labor for white planters.
It describes why the colonists wanted to be free from Britain and what led to their decision to fight against British rule.
Answer:
The Treaty of Paris of 1783 failed to resolve, or in some cases helped to create, strain among the United States, England, and Spain by creating disputes over boundaries of land between England and the US, creating tension over trade between England and the US, and creating tension over the Florida boundary and rights.
Explanation:
Answer:
Both Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis had to deal with contentious congresses with often clashing interests and agendas. In Davis’ case the discord was intrinsic in the very “States’ Rights” concept behind the Confederacy, though in practice Lincoln had plenty of cat herding of his own to do. Lincoln was arguably the more successful president in having better political instincts, which became more evident as he grew into his presidency—a talent for knowing when and how to cajole, horse-trade, bribe outright or ruthlessly assert his power, depending on who he was dealing with. For all the thinking on his feet that he did, however, Lincoln never lost sight of his principal goal, and in 1864 he ultimately found generals who shared the Commander-in-Chief’s intent. Davis was less adept at this, often letting his generals do the strategizing for him (after Robert E. Lee’s stunning success in the Seven Days Campaign, it was hard for Davis to argue when Marse Robert proposed taking the fight north into Yankee territory). Davis’ judgment in picking senior generals in the critical Western theater of operations (Braxton Bragg, then Joseph E. Johnston, followed by John Bell Hood) also speaks for itself; Lincoln’s worst choices in the East were finally behind him by the time he turned to Ulysses S. Grant in March 1864.
