It has been frequently and rightly remarked that the Crito is unique among
Plato’s dialogues insofar as its primary concern is what Socrates ought to do.
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Most interpreters assume that Socrates ought to do what seems best to his reason (Cr 46b3-6); thus, most interpretations defend the rationality of obedience
or disobedience. On my account, it is not at all obvious that Socrates ought to
do what seems best to his reason. On my account, Socrates does not do what
seems best to his reason because he does not reason about whether he should
obey the laws; he simply obeys the laws. Doubtless, this claim seems counterintuitive to many; after all, does not Socrates articulate and defend his reasons
for remaining in prison from 49c to 54c? Is it not the cogency of Socrates’ reasons
for remaining in prison that have been so thoroughly debated in the scholarship summarized below? My answer to both of these questions is ‘no.’ Perhaps
counter-intuitively I claim that the reasons for remaining in prison, from Crito
49c to54c, are not Socrates’ reasons; they are the arguments of the speaking laws
of Athens
