Rentier state hypothesis is a bunch of thoughts regarding why states with significant characteristic asset abundance seem to have fundamentally the same as financial and political advancement directions. This article looks all the more carefully at the recommendation that oil rentier states have explicit highlights that make them far-fetched to become combined popular governments. It limits the rentier state system to three such highlights: first, that rentier states don't depend on tax collection for money and accordingly are delivered from popularity based commitments to their citizens; second, that the state spends oil incomes on assuaging and subduing its populace; and third, that the social structure in rentier states pretty much rules out fair resistance. In looking at three African rentier states, in particular Algeria, Nigeria and Libya, the article discovers a few areas of rentier state hypothesis to have more illustrative incentive than others. In every one of the three cases government spending on government assistance and suppression has hosed the weights for democratization. The social structure contention appears to be more legitimate for Algeria and Nigeria than for Libya. In none of the cases does the connection among tax collection and portrayal seem, by all accounts, to be a huge determinant of system type. Despite the fact that the investigation affirms that oil abundance is related with absolutism, the causal components of rentier state hypothesis could profit by being refined.
