Answer:
Both breeches and pantaloons were worn during the 1810s. Breeches extended to the knee where they were fastened with buttons and a buckle or tie (Fig. 1); pantaloons, which had originated in the 1790s, were very tightly-fitted and longer, extending to the calf or ankle where they fastened with ties or buttons (Fig. 4)(Byrde 93; Johnston 14). Either could be worn during the day, but breeches were the proper evening attire with white stockings and evening pumps (Fig. 5). For daywear, both were frequently worn with tall boots, a favorite fashion of early nineteenth century menswear (le Bourhis 112). It was particularly in vogue to wear pantaloons tucked into “hessian” boots, defined by heart-shaped tops and tassels (Laver 160). Named for the Hessian mercenary soldiers from Germany, these boots and clinging pantaloons, which displayed a man’s leg muscles to great effect, lent a martial glamour to civilian dress (Ashelford 186; Johnston 14). The man in figure 1 of the Womenswear section sports pantaloons and hessians.
Answer:
The red Army learning from their own mistakes
the vast improvement, training for officers and men was design to encourage greater initiative and technology available was hastily modernized
Allowing the army to profit from the reform of operational practice.
Explanation:
The transformation in Soviet fighting power and morale has a number of explanations. In the first place the Red Army learned a great deal from German practice and from their own mistakes.
The air and tank armies were reorganized to mimic the German Panzer divisions and air fleets; communication and intelligence were vastly improved (helped by a huge supply of American and British telephone equipment and cable); training for officers and men was designed to encourage greater initiative; and the technology available was hastily modernized to match German.
Two other changes proved vital to allow the army to profit from the reform of operational practice. First, Soviet industry and workforce proved remarkable adaptable for a command economy long regarded as inherently inefficient and inflexible.
The pre-war experience of economic planning and mobilization helped the regime to run a war economy on an emergency basis, while the vast exodus of workers (an estimated 16 million) and factories (more than 2,500 major plants) from in front of the advancing Germans allowed the USSR to reconstruct its armaments economy in central and eastern Russia with great rapidity.
The second factor lay with politics. Until the summer of 1942 Stalin and the Party closely controlled the Red Army. Political commissars worked directly alongside senior officers and reported straight back to the Kremlin. Stalin came to realize that political control was a dead hand on the army and cut it back sharply in the autumn of 1942
Loyalists suffered regular harassment because the patriots were not a tolerant group. The patriots would seize property, harass and attack the loyalists
Fascism. Despite ongoing racial discrimination at home, many Mexican-Americans and African-Americans knew if Germany and Italy were to win, fascism would be a more unbearable fate.
