Answer:
- The modified internal rate of return for PROJECT A:
b. 24.18%
- The internal rate of return for Project B :
b. 35.27%.
Explanation:
The mean difference between the MIRR and the IRR it's that the IRR assumes that the obtained positive cash flows are reinvested at the same rate at which they were generated, while the MIRR considers that these cashflow will be reinvested at the external rate of return, this case 10%.
Project A Y1 Y2
-$95,000 $65,000 $75,000
24,18% MIRR
Project B -$120,000
Y 1 $64,000
Y 2 $67,000
Y 3 $56,000
Y 4 $45,000
TIR 35,27%
Answer:
b
Explanation:
Another definition:
It is the purchase price of an asset + the costs of operating the asset
Answer:
$12
Explanation:
If P = $2 then the Q will be;
Q = 20 - 4 * 2
Q = 20 - 8
Q = 12
The maximum annual membership fee will be equal to the amount of demand. The annual membership fee cannot be greater than the demand function if so there will be decline in the demand.
The input for opening a summer band camp would be information. The band camp has to have instructors for the camp to teach the students, furthering their education in music. It may also need to have instruments. It will then convert these services and equipment into its output, lessons learned in which the students/parents would pay for.
Answer: Ethical Obligations and Decision-Making in Accounting-The Heading is devoted to helping students cultivate the ethical commitment needed to ensure that their work meets the highest standards of integrity, independence, and objectivity.
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Explanation: The first, addressed in Part I, is the administrative cost of deregulation, which has grown substantially under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.Part II addresses the consequences of the FCC's use of a competitor-welfare standard when formulating its policies for local competition, rather than a consumer-welfare standard. I evaluate the reported features of the FCC's decision in its Triennial Review. Press releases and statements concerning that decision suggest that the FCC may have finally embraced a consumer-welfare approach to mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices. The haphazard administrative process surrounding the FCC's decision, however, increases the likelihood of reversal on appeal.Beginning in Part III, I address at greater length the WorldCom fraud and bankruptcy. I offer an early assessment of the harm to the telecommunications industry from WorldCom's fraud and bankruptcy. I explain how WorldCom's misconduct caused collateral damage to other telecommunications firms, government, workers, and the capital markets. WorldCom's false Internet traffic reports and accounting fraud encouraged overinvestment in long-distance capacity and Internet backbone capacity. Because Internet traffic data are proprietary and WorldCom dominated Internet backbone services, and because WorldCom was subject to regulatory oversight, it was reasonable for rival carriers to believe WorldCom's misrepresentation of Internet traffic growth. Event study analysis suggests that the harm to rival carriers and telecommunications equipment manufacturers from WorldCom's restatement of earnings was $7.8 billion. WorldCom's false or fraudulent statements also supplied state and federal governments with incorrect information essential to the formulation of telecommunication policy. State and federal governments, courts, and regulatory commissions would thus be justified in applying extreme skepticism to future representations made by WorldCom.Part IV explains how WorldCom's fraud and bankruptcy may have been intended to harm competition, and in the future may do so, by inducing exit (or forfeiture of market share) by the company's rivals. WorldCom repeatedly deceived investors, competitors, and regulators with false statements about its Internet traffic projections and financial performance. At a minimum, WorldCom's fraudulent or false