The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) sponsored<span> most of the subsequent </span>Freedom Rides<span>, but some were also organized by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).</span>
Answer:
The Know-Nothing Party
Explanation:
The American Party favored by the <u>nativist</u>s was also called by people as "The Know-Nothing Party." It started as a <em>secret society </em>in the <em>1850s</em> and propelled as<u> a movement against the Catholics (especially in the North) and immigration.</u>
People who belong to the group (especially the Protestants) were fearful that the Catholic priests would take control of the voters. So, when members were asked about their party's information (since little was known about them), they would reply "I Know Nothing."
This party didn't last that long because the leaders were deemed incapable and they also had varying opinions about issues on slavery.
Answer:
Because they need to watch over the south to make sure they were filling the new laws and to keep slaves free.
Answer: Domestic system, also called putting-out system, production system widespread in 17th-century western Europe in which merchant-employers “put out” materials to rural producers who usually worked in their homes but sometimes laboured in workshops or in turn put out work to others.
Explanation:
Answer:
Both Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis had to deal with contentious congresses with often clashing interests and agendas. In Davis’ case the discord was intrinsic in the very “States’ Rights” concept behind the Confederacy, though in practice Lincoln had plenty of cat herding of his own to do. Lincoln was arguably the more successful president in having better political instincts, which became more evident as he grew into his presidency—a talent for knowing when and how to cajole, horse-trade, bribe outright or ruthlessly assert his power, depending on who he was dealing with. For all the thinking on his feet that he did, however, Lincoln never lost sight of his principal goal, and in 1864 he ultimately found generals who shared the Commander-in-Chief’s intent. Davis was less adept at this, often letting his generals do the strategizing for him (after Robert E. Lee’s stunning success in the Seven Days Campaign, it was hard for Davis to argue when Marse Robert proposed taking the fight north into Yankee territory). Davis’ judgment in picking senior generals in the critical Western theater of operations (Braxton Bragg, then Joseph E. Johnston, followed by John Bell Hood) also speaks for itself; Lincoln’s worst choices in the East were finally behind him by the time he turned to Ulysses S. Grant in March 1864.
