I think A
i am like 80 % sure
The correct answer to this open question is the following.
Although you did not specify the time in history or any specific context, we are going to assume that you are referring to the US imperialistic role through history.
Being that the case, we can comment on the following.
The foreign policy actions of the United States reflect selfish, imperialist ambitions since the times of President James Polk and the Manifested Destiny. He expanded the US territory acquiring the Mexican northern states after the Mexican-American War.
Since those years, passing through the times of President Monroe and the Monroe Doctrine and President Theodore Roosevelt and his Roosevelt corollary, the United States has always had interventionist purposes as part of its foreign agenda.
Nobody has granted the US the right or role to be the "big brother" who was looking after the interests of the western hemisphere. That is why the US has had many problems throughout history in the Middle East, Latin America, Europe, and other regions.
he powers of Congress are enumerated in several places in the Constitution. ... The last paragraph of Article I, Section 8 grants to Congress the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers"--the "Necessary and Proper Clause."
can i get brainliest if you mind thanks
Answer:
See explanation
Explanation:
So the people they elect can hopefully carry out what they want.
Answer:
The took it for themselves kind of.
Explanation:
On Aug. 19, 1953, elements inside Iran organized and funded by the Central Intelligence Agency and British intelligence services carried out a coup d’état that overthrew the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Historians have yet to reach a consensus on why the Eisenhower administration opted to use covert action in Iran, tending to either emphasize America’s fear of communism or its desire to control oil as the most important factor influencing the decision. Using recently declassified material, this article argues that growing fears of a “collapse” in Iran motivated the decision to remove Mossadegh. American policymakers believed that Iran could not survive without an agreement that would restart the flow of oil, something Mossadegh appeared unable to secure. There was widespread scepticism of his government’s ability to manage an “oil-less” economy, as well as fears that such a situation would lead inexorably to communist rule. A collapse narrative emerged to guide U.S. thinking, one that coalesced in early 1953 and convinced policymakers to adopt regime change as the only remaining option. Oil and communism both impacted the coup decision, but so did powerful notions of Iranian incapacity and a belief that only an intervention by the United States would save the country from a looming, though vaguely defined, calamity.
