Answer:
Explanation:
Instituted in the hope of avoiding war, appeasement was the name given to Britain’s policy in the 1930s of allowing Hitler to expand German territory unchecked. Most closely associated with British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, it is now widely discredited as a policy of weakness. Yet at the time, it was a popular and seemingly pragmatic policy. Hitler’s expansionist aims became clear in 1936 when his forces entered the Rhineland. Two years later, in March 1938, he annexed Austria. At the Munich Conference that September, Neville Chamberlain seemed to have averted war by agreeing that Germany could occupy the Sudetenland, the German-speaking part of Czechoslovakia - this became known as the Munich Agreement. In Britain, the Munich Agreement was greeted with jubilation. However, Winston Churchill, then estranged from government and one of the few to oppose appeasement of Hitler, described it as ‘an unmitigated disaster’. Appeasement was popular for several reasons. Chamberlain - and the British people - were desperate to avoid the slaughter of another world war. Britain was overstretched policing its empire and could not afford major rearmament. Its main ally, France, was seriously weakened and, unlike in the First World War, Commonwealth support was not a certainty. Many Britons also sympathised with Germany, which they felt had been treated unfairly following its defeat in 1918. But, despite his promise of ‘no more territorial demands in Europe’, Hitler was undeterred by appeasement. In March 1939, he violated the Munich Agreement by occupying the rest of Czechoslovakia. Six months later, in September 1939, Germany invaded Poland and Britain was at war.
After the Cold War ended, promoting the international spread of democracy seemed poised to replace containment as the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy. Scholars, policymakers, and commentators embraced the idea that democratization could become America's next mission. In recent years, however, critics have argued that spreading democracy may be unwise or even harmful. This paper addresses this debate. It argues that the United States should promote democracy and refutes some of the most important arguments against U.S. efforts to spread democracy. After a brief discussion of definitions of democracy and liberalism, the paper summarizes the reasons why the spread of democracy— especially liberal democracy— benefits the citizens of new democracies, promotes international peace, and serves U.S. interests. Because the case for democratization is rarely made comprehensively, the paper explicates the arguments for why democracy promotes liberty, prevents famines, and fosters economic development. The logic and evidence of a democratic peace are also summarized, as are the ways in which U.S. security and economic interests would be advanced in a world of democracies. These benefits to U.S. interests include a reduction in threats to the United States, fewer refugees attempting to enter the United States, and better economic partners for American trade and investment. The paper then turns to a rebuttal of four prominent recent arguments against the benefits of spreading democracy: (1) the claim that the democratic peace is a myth; (2) the argument that the process of democratization increases the risk of war; (3) arguments that democratic elections are harmful in societies that are not fully liberal; and (4) claims that "Asian values" can undergird polities based on "soft authoritarianism" that are superior to liberal democracies. The paper argues that these recent critiques of U.S. efforts to promote democracy have not presented a convincing case that spreading democracy is a bad idea. The internationa spread of democracy will offer many benefits to new democracies and to the United States. The democratic peace proposition appears robust, even if scholars need to continue to develop multiple explanations for why democracies rarely, if ever, go to war. The evidence on whether democratization increases the risk of war is mixed, at best, and policies can be crafted to minimize any risks of conflict in these cases. The problem of "illiberal democracy" has been exaggerated; democratic elections usually do more good than harm. The United States should, however, aim to promote liberal values as well as electoral democracy. And the "soft authoritarian" challenge to liberal democracy was not persuasive, even before the Asian economic turmoil of 1997 and 1998 undermined claims for the superiority of "Asian values." These are one of the reasons why they should promote democracy aboard
Harry S. Truman was the first to deliver his inaugural address to a televised audience; Kennedy would be the first to do so on color television in 1961.
