The overwhelming consensus of observers in the 1890s, and historians ever since, is that an upsurge of humanitarian concern with the plight of the Cubans was the main motivating force that caused the war with Spain in 1898. McKinley put it succinctly in late 1897 that if Spain failed to resolve its crisis, the United States would see “a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity to intervene with force."Intervention in terms of negotiating a settlement proved impossible—neither Spain nor the insurgents would agree. Louis Perez states, "Certainly the moralistic determinants of war in 1898 has been accorded preponderant explanatory weight in the historiography."
By the 1950s, however, American political scientists began attacking the war as a mistake based on idealism, arguing that a better policy would be realism. They discredited the idealism by suggesting the people were deliberately misled by propaganda and sensationalist yellow journalism. Political scientist Robert Osgood, writing in 1953, led the attack on the American decision process as a confused mix of "self-righteousness and genuine moral fervor," in the form of a "crusade" and a combination of "knight-errantry and national self- assertiveness."
Four of the acts were issued in direct response to the Boston Tea Party of December 16, 1773. The British Parliament hoped these punitive measures would, by making an example of Massachusetts, reverse the trend of colonial resistance to parliamentary authority that had begun with the 1764 Sugar Act. A fifth act, the Quebec Act, enlarged the boundaries of what was then the Province of Quebec and instituted reforms generally favorable to the French Catholic inhabitants of the region; although unrelated to the other four Acts, it was passed in the same legislative session and seen by the colonists as one of the Intolerable Acts. The Patriots viewed the acts as an arbitrary violation of the rights of Massachusetts, and in September 1774 they organized the First Continental Congress to coordinate a protest. As tensions escalated, the American Revolutionary War broke out in April 1775, leading in July 1776 to the declaration of an independent United States of USA
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Answer The power of the President to refuse to approve a bill or joint resolution and thus prevent its enactment into law is the veto. The president has ten days (excluding Sundays) to sign a bill passed by Congress. A regular veto occurs when the President returns the legislation to the house in which it originated, usually with a message explaining the rationale for the veto. This veto can be overridden only by a two-thirds vote in both the Senate and the House. If this occurs, the bill becomes law over the President's objections. A pocket veto occurs when Congress adjourns during the ten-day period. The president cannot return the bill to Congress. The president's decision not to sign the legislation is a pocket veto and Congress does not have the opportunity to override.
Explanation:
Answer:
Napolean crowned himself emperor.
Explanation:
Napolean Bonaparte's coronation in 1804 is ironic since he declared himself Emperor. Napoleon Bonaparte was France's first emperor and considered one of the country's finest military leaders. Napoleon was recognized as a military genius because he won several wars for France, allowing the country to expand. Despite his military background, Napolean crowned himself Emperor and declared that he would not be ruled by the Romans or submit to any force other than himself. As a result, the Crowning of 1804 is ironic because he crowned himself Emperor.