There is a tale, "The Ring of Gyges," that Feldman sometimes tells his economist friends. It comes from Plato’s Republic. A stud
ent named Glaucon offered the story in response to a lesson by Socrates—who, like Adam Smith, argued that people are generally good even without enforcement. Glaucon, like Feldman’s economist friends, disagreed. He told of a shepherd named Gyges who stumbled upon a secret cavern with a corpse inside that wore a ring. When Gyges put on the ring, he found that it made him invisible. With no one able to monitor his behavior, Gyges proceeded to do woeful things—seduce the queen, murder the king, and so on. Glaucon’s story posed a moral question: could any man resist the temptation of evil if he knew his acts could not be witnessed?
Glaucon seemed to think the answer was no. But Paul Feldman sides with Socrates and Adam Smith—for he knows the answer, at least 87 percent of the time, is yes.
Explanation:
Compared with Feldman's argument, the tale of "The Ring of Gyges" is best described as a counterclaim to the idea that most people are moral. The tale is about the corruption of a man, Gyges, that found a ring that made him invisible. One he had that power he saw no reason to follow society's morals and did whatever he wanted to. One could argue that the reason that many people have to "behave" or to act according to the law and morals of a society is the look of others. The judgment that one would encounter should he not follow a certain rule, even if they are "little" things.
