The outcome of the Korean War increased tension between several world's superpowers during the Cold War.
- Because it demonstrated that the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, could engage in a "limited war" in a third nation, the Korean War was crucial in the evolution of the Cold War.
- America intended to stop the domino effect as well as keep communism in check. Truman was concerned that Japan, which was crucial for American trade, might fall next if Korea fell. This was most likely the main justification for America's engagement in the conflict.
- Government expenditure on the Korean War increased GDP growth, which in turn restrained investment and consumption. Taxes were greatly increased to pay for the war, while the Federal Reserve pursued an anti-inflationary strategy.
Thus this was the aftermath of Korean war.
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Answer:
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Answer:
The red Army learning from their own mistakes
the vast improvement, training for officers and men was design to encourage greater initiative and technology available was hastily modernized
Allowing the army to profit from the reform of operational practice.
Explanation:
The transformation in Soviet fighting power and morale has a number of explanations. In the first place the Red Army learned a great deal from German practice and from their own mistakes.
The air and tank armies were reorganized to mimic the German Panzer divisions and air fleets; communication and intelligence were vastly improved (helped by a huge supply of American and British telephone equipment and cable); training for officers and men was designed to encourage greater initiative; and the technology available was hastily modernized to match German.
Two other changes proved vital to allow the army to profit from the reform of operational practice. First, Soviet industry and workforce proved remarkable adaptable for a command economy long regarded as inherently inefficient and inflexible.
The pre-war experience of economic planning and mobilization helped the regime to run a war economy on an emergency basis, while the vast exodus of workers (an estimated 16 million) and factories (more than 2,500 major plants) from in front of the advancing Germans allowed the USSR to reconstruct its armaments economy in central and eastern Russia with great rapidity.
The second factor lay with politics. Until the summer of 1942 Stalin and the Party closely controlled the Red Army. Political commissars worked directly alongside senior officers and reported straight back to the Kremlin. Stalin came to realize that political control was a dead hand on the army and cut it back sharply in the autumn of 1942
