Answer:
1. to ensure there's food to trade for vital natural resources in other countries.
Explanation:
You can't start an industrial revolution without necessary resources and materials to do so, and in order to get these materials you must make sure there's food to trade for them.
Part 1:
The stresses that were in the Jewish kingdom became apparent even throughout the continuance of King Solomon.
The Jewish people, by nature, are very challenging to consolidate. They are strongly individualistic and independent-minded. The alliance that was throughout the reigns of Kings Saul, David and Solomon were not unnatural, but it depended upon the importance of the leader’s character. Common leaders are incompetent at keeping the Jewish people unitedly. Regrettably, the Sauls, Davids, and Solomons of the world are limited. That is why most of the time the Jewish people do not find themselves consolidated.
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Part 2:
The Kingdom of Israel was conquered by the Neo-Assyrian Empire (circa 722 BCE), and the Kingdom of Judah by the Neo-Babylonian Empire (586 BCE). In the fall of the Babylonian Empire by the Achaemenid Empire following Cyrus the Great (538 BCE), the Jewish aristocracy turned to Jerusalem, and the Second Temple was constructed.
I believe the correct answer from the choices listed above is option B. An incentive is defined as <span>a gesture or a reward to increase productivity or motivation. Hope this answers the question. Have a nice day. Feel free to ask more questions.</span>
Answer: I'm balanced I agree and disagree here is why,
Peter C. Perdue's China Marches West argues that the Qing dynasty's ability to break through historical territorial barriers on China's northwestern frontier reflected greater Manchu familiarity with steppe culture than their Chinese predecessors had exhibited, reinforced by superior commercial, technical, and symbolic resources and the benefits of a Russian alliance. Qing imperial expansion illustrated patterns of territorial consolidation apparent as well in Russia's forward movement in Inner Asia and, ironically, in the heroic, if ultimately futile, projects of the western Mongols who fell victim to the Qing. After summarizing Perdue's thesis, this essay extends his comparisons geographically and chronologically to argue that between 1600 and 1800 states ranging from western Europe through Japan to Southeast Asia exhibited similar patterns of political and cultural integration and that synchronized integrative cycles across Eurasia extended from the ninth to the nineteenth centuries. Yet in its growing vulnerability to Inner Asian domination, China proper—along with other sectors of the "exposed zone" of Eurasia—exemplified a species of state formation that was reasonably distinct from trajectories in sectors of Eurasia that were protected against Inner Asian conquest.
