John Quincy Adams
Hope this finds your homework well!
Answer:
It started with the "Black Ships" of 1854, when the USA forcibly opened up Japan for trade and westernization.
Explanation:
On the 1st of March 1854, Commodore Matthew Perry opened up Japan for trade by showing them his armada of steel ships which were superior to anything the Japanese had. At the time, the emperor had no real power, it was the Shogun who ruled the country. However, as the country westernized (becoming more like the western countries), Japan eventually had a government with different parties instead.
Ever since 1854, a feeling of nationalism had been growing since the Japanese were forced out of their old ways.
Also because westernization included colonialism, expansionism, capitalism, and nationalism
Nationalism in Japan in the 19th century (1800's) was not a big problem until the 20th century. It was then that the fear of communism created more nationalistic feelings, as well as that certain movements wanted Japan to rule East Asia. This eventually led to the unintentional invasion of China by the Kwantung army that the government had lost control of, which led to the Sino-Japanese war.
<h2><u><em>Your answer would be B. Federal courts address traffic violations, which fall under local ordinances.</em></u></h2>
Answer:
The took it for themselves kind of.
Explanation:
On Aug. 19, 1953, elements inside Iran organized and funded by the Central Intelligence Agency and British intelligence services carried out a coup d’état that overthrew the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Historians have yet to reach a consensus on why the Eisenhower administration opted to use covert action in Iran, tending to either emphasize America’s fear of communism or its desire to control oil as the most important factor influencing the decision. Using recently declassified material, this article argues that growing fears of a “collapse” in Iran motivated the decision to remove Mossadegh. American policymakers believed that Iran could not survive without an agreement that would restart the flow of oil, something Mossadegh appeared unable to secure. There was widespread scepticism of his government’s ability to manage an “oil-less” economy, as well as fears that such a situation would lead inexorably to communist rule. A collapse narrative emerged to guide U.S. thinking, one that coalesced in early 1953 and convinced policymakers to adopt regime change as the only remaining option. Oil and communism both impacted the coup decision, but so did powerful notions of Iranian incapacity and a belief that only an intervention by the United States would save the country from a looming, though vaguely defined, calamity.
