The Native Americans felt so strongly about the land where Custer's Last Stand was fought because it had been there home for several years. They felt that it was unfair that the federal government would force them to move elsewhere just because gold was found on that land. To show their resistance, the Native Americans refused to move from their territory by the deadline given by the federal government.
When Custer and members of the US military went to confront these tribes (Lakota Sioux and Cheyenne) Custer severely underestimated how many troops there would be from these tribes. Lead by Sitting Bull, the Sioux and Cheyenne overwhelmed the American forces, resulting in an extremely embarrassing loss for the US military.
Carl Vinson was a United States Representative from Georgia he served more than 50 years and was Democrat he is the longest serving representative from Georgia
Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting. . . .
Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for deporting and detaining these citizens of Japanese extraction. But a judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself. A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency. Even during that period a succeeding commander may revoke it all. But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. . . . A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image. Nothing better illustrates this danger than does the Court’s opinion in this case. . . .
yes i copy and pasted but this is your answer
Answer:
Hannibal made one major tactical error: He did not attack and capture Rome when he had the opportunity.
Hannibal conducted his operations in Italy not as one campaign in a larger war but as the only campaign in the only war. He seemed to hold to the conviction that if he won enough battles, he would win Italy. And if he won Italy, victory over the Roman people would be his. Battles are the means to a strategic end, not ends in themselves. Hannibal was a sworn enemy of the Romans and he let his emotions cloud out that fact when he launched the second Punic War. He could win every battle, but he did not apply those battles to wining the war.
There seemed to be some confusion between tactics and strategy in his mind. This caused him to commit a number of operational failures that led to his eventual defeat in Romes heartland.
The Carthaginian senate had failed to send him critical supplies and troops when most needed. He had severe logistical problems. Tactics win battles, logistics win wars. There was no good reason why supply transports could not have gotten through to Hannibal.
Moronically, Carthage’s strategic shift away from Italy after Cannae came at a time when Hannibal’s momentum was at its full. Cannae was an absolutely devastating defeat for the Romans. Politics.
Hannibal was eventually called back to Carthage because of the military failures of his compatriots. The Romans had pushed into Carthaginian territory, and they needed reinforcements.
Explanation:
That is definitely Okies, I did this literally yesterday. Plus it's in my book. Hope this helped! :)
