Answer: Josh's bonus is $35,289.53.
In the question above, we need to look at the net savings that will occur from selling drinks instead of giving them as complimentary drinks. So we have,
Net Savings per year = $11.04 million
The company's MARR = 15%
Josh's bonus is 0.14% of the present value of three years' net savings.
Since the quantum of savings is constant each year, we can calculate the present value of these savings by using the Present Value of annuity formula.
![PVA = P * \left [\frac{1-(1+r)^{-n}}{r} \right ]](https://tex.z-dn.net/?f=%20PVA%20%3D%20P%20%2A%20%5Cleft%20%5B%5Cfrac%7B1-%281%2Br%29%5E%7B-n%7D%7D%7Br%7D%20%5Cright%20%5D%20)

PVA = Present value of three years' net savings = 25.20680529
million
Josh's bonus : 0.14% of present value of three years' net savings.

Josh's Bonus = $0.035289527
million or $35,289.53.
Answer:
3 years
Explanation:
The formula to compute the payback period is shown below:
= Initial investment ÷ Net cash flow
where,
Initial investment is $450,000
And, the net cash flow = annual net operating income + depreciation expenses
= $105,000 + $45,000
= $150,000
Now put these values to the above formula
So, the value would equal to
= ($450,000) ÷ ($150,000)
= 3 years
Answer:
Fixed weekly pay
Explanation:
The Walling v. A.H. specified weekly salary for variable employees job challenge for flexible workers Ruling document of the Belo Company Supreme Court. Workers who work varying workweeks receive a set wage, irrespective about how many times per week may work. For starters, if they operated 35 or 40 hours, the employee should receive the same weekly wage. Therefore, the hourly wage of a salaried employee differs depending according to how many hours they work.
All of the above are correct
Answer:
The correct answer is the option B: charges the highest bidder only a penny more than the bid of the second-highest bidder.
Explanation:
To begin with, the model of <em>''the second-price auction''</em> is a non-truthful auction mechanism in which every bidder places a bid but with the little particularity that the one who has the highest bid, and therefore the one who gets the first slot, only pays the price bid by the second highest bidder, and this last one only pays the price bid by the third highest bidder and so on. Therefore that this auction mechanism is non-truthful because the bidder does not pay the price he said he would, but he pays the price bid by the other person.