Answer:
A law of the United States Congress entitled "Pacific Railroad Act
Explanation:
A law of the United States Congress entitled "Pacific Railroad Act" where it was authorized to provide assistance for the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri River (in the center of the country) to the Pacific Ocean coast, assuring the Government of use of it for postal, military and other purposes. The law was passed by President Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War and its objective was primarily military.
This law authorized extensive land concessions in the western United States and the issuance of 30-year government bonds (at 6% annual interest) for the Union Pacific Railroad and the Central Pacific Railroad ( Central Pacific Railroad) in order to both constitute the first transcontinental railroad in the United States.
This was the great impulse to launch the railways throughout the country and ensure that the future is transported cargo in a more economical and efficient way
In the Spanish Civil War, the Republicans represented the democratically elected government. There was a great conflict between Republicans and Nationalists during the civil war.
Answer:
American cities decline / hollowed out into post-industrial wastelands. Industries fled overseas as other corporations sought lower wage costs.
Answer:
The took it for themselves kind of.
Explanation:
On Aug. 19, 1953, elements inside Iran organized and funded by the Central Intelligence Agency and British intelligence services carried out a coup d’état that overthrew the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Historians have yet to reach a consensus on why the Eisenhower administration opted to use covert action in Iran, tending to either emphasize America’s fear of communism or its desire to control oil as the most important factor influencing the decision. Using recently declassified material, this article argues that growing fears of a “collapse” in Iran motivated the decision to remove Mossadegh. American policymakers believed that Iran could not survive without an agreement that would restart the flow of oil, something Mossadegh appeared unable to secure. There was widespread scepticism of his government’s ability to manage an “oil-less” economy, as well as fears that such a situation would lead inexorably to communist rule. A collapse narrative emerged to guide U.S. thinking, one that coalesced in early 1953 and convinced policymakers to adopt regime change as the only remaining option. Oil and communism both impacted the coup decision, but so did powerful notions of Iranian incapacity and a belief that only an intervention by the United States would save the country from a looming, though vaguely defined, calamity.
