Answer:
Both houses must accept the bill
Explanation:
Before a bill can be passed on to the president to either veto or pass, it must first be approved by both the House and the Senate. The houses generally hash out their differences, rewrite the bill, and provide the final draft to the president who can then either veto the bill or pass it. There are also other ways in which a bill can be passed if the president vetoes it. For example, the chamber that originated the legislation can attempt to override the veto by a vote of two-thirds of those present.
Answer:
Explanation:
The President nominates someone for a vacancy on the Court and the Senate votes to confirm the nominee, which requires a simple majority. In this way, both the Executive and Legislative Branches of the federal government have a voice in the composition of the Supreme Court.
Answer:
Locard exchange is basically wherever you go you always leave something behind...this can help in a crime scene because it can help identify the suspect
Explanation:
things you can leave via Locard exchange
-hair
-fingerprints
-dead skin cells
-shoe print
Answer:
Put simply, a criminal conspiracy is an agreement to commit an unlawful act. The agreement itself is the crime, but at least one co-conspirator must take an “overt act” in furtherance of the conspiracy. Under the federal conspiracy statute: The agreement by two or more persons is the essence of the crime.
Explanation:
Our question is this: What makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as (or as deputies of) law-enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons we explain, does not settle questions of permissibility and culpability. We explain, compare, and contrast two existing definitions of legal entrapment to commit a crime that possess this neutrality. We point out some problems with the extensional correctness of these definitions and propose a new definition that resolves these problems. We then extend our definition to provide a more general definition of entrapment, encompassing both civil and legal cases. Our definition is, we believe, closer to being extensionally correct and will, we hope, provide a clearer basis for future discussions about the ethics of entrapment than do the definitions upon which it improves.
