It was called “A Portuguese Expedition”
Answer:
From this, people often jump to the conclusion that the dominant trait is also the most common one. This isn’t always the case and there is no reason it should be.
Whether or not a trait is common has to do with how many copies of that gene version (or allele) are in the population. It has little or nothing to do with whether the trait is dominant or recessive.
Let’s take eye color as an example. The decision on whether to have brown eyes or not is pretty much controlled by a single gene, OCA2.
More on genetics
We can think of OCA2 as having two versions, brown and not-brown. The brown allele of OCA2 is dominant over the not-brown allele.
Nearly everyone in most of Africa has brown eyes. This isn’t because brown eyes are dominant over blue and green. Instead, it is because there are mostly brown alleles of OCA2 in the African population.
Northern Europe is a different story. In some parts of the continent, over 80% of the population has lighter colored eyes. Here the not-brown allele is more common even though it is recessive.
Now this allele isn’t exclusive, there are still brown-eyed folks in northern Europe. So why don’t their brown eyes dominate over time? Because in populations, dominant isn’t dominant over other people’s recessive gene versions. Your brown eyes can’t affect my kids’ eye color unless we get married.
Let’s do a thought experiment to make this clearer. To simplify things we’ll call brown eyes B and not-brown eyes b.
Explanation:
Question- Why did the Constitution allow Slavery?
Answer- On Monday, Senator Bernie Sanders told his audience at Liberty University that the United States “in many ways was created” as a nation “from way back on racist principles.” Not everyone agreed. The historian Sean Wilentz took to The New York Times to write that Bernie Sanders—and a lot of his colleagues—have it all wrong about the founding of the United States. The Constitution that protected slavery for three generations, until a devastating war and a constitutional amendment changed the game, was actually antislavery because it didn’t explicitly recognize “property in humans.” Lincoln certainly said so, and cited the same passage from Madison’s notes that Wilentz used. But does that make it so? And does it gainsay Sanders’s inelegant but apparently necessary voicing of what ought to be obvious, what David Brion Davis, Wilentz’s scholarly mentor and my own, wrote back in 1966—that the nation was “in many ways” founded on racial slavery? If the absence of an ironclad guarantee of a right to property in men really “quashed” the slaveholders, it should be apparent in the rest of the document, by which the nation was actually governed. But of the 11 clauses in the Constitution that deal with or have policy implications for slavery, 10 protect slave property and the powers of masters. Only one, the international slave-trade clause, points to a possible future power by which, after 20 years, slavery might be curtailed—and it didn’t work out that way at all. The three-fifths clause, which states that three-fifths of “all other persons” (i.e. slaves) will be counted for both taxation and representation, was a major boon to the slave states. This is well known; it’s astounding to see Wilentz try to pooh-pooh it. No, it wasn’t counting five-fifths, but counting 60 percent of slaves added enormously to slave-state power in the formative years of the republic. By 1800, northern critics called this phenomenon “the slave power” and called for its repeal. With the aid of the second article of the Constitution, which numbered presidential electors by adding the number of representatives in the House to the number of senators, the three-fifths clause enabled the elections of plantation masters Jefferson in 1800 and Polk in 1844. Just as importantly, the tax liability for three-fifths of the slaves turned out to mean nothing. Sure the federal government could pass a head tax, but it almost never did. It hardly could when the taxes had to emerge from the House, where the South was 60 percent overrepresented. So the South gained political power, without having to surrender much of anything in exchange. Indeed, all the powers delegated to the House—that is, the most democratic aspects of the Constitution—were disproportionately affected by what critics quickly came to call “slave representation.” These included the commerce clause—a compromise measure that gave the federal government power to regulate commerce, but only at the price of giving disproportionate power to slave states. And as if that wasn’t enough, Congress was forbidden from passing export duties—at a time when most of the value of what the U.S. exported lay in slave-grown commodities. This was one of the few things (in addition to regulating the slave trade for 20 years) that Congress was forbidden to do. Slavery and democracy in the U.S. were joined at the 60-percent-replaced hip. Another clause in Article I allowed Congress to mobilize “the Militia” to “suppress insurrections”—again, the House with its disproportionate votes would decide whether a slave rebellion counted as an insurrection. Wilentz repeats the old saw that with the rise of the northwest, the slave power’s real bastion was the Senate. Hence the battles over the admission of slave and free states that punctuated the path to Civil War. But this reads history backwards from the 1850s, not forward from 1787.
