Answer:
There are enough intent and action to commit a crime. By burglarizing the store and moving some goods to the rear door, Baker and his co-travellers have established specific intent to commit larceny.
Specific intent requires planning before the time and the predisposition to commit the act. They have even establish general intent by actually entering the store and cutting through the metal door with an acetylene torch.
Explanation:
Larceny is robbery. The intent to commit a crime by Baker and his co-travellers is established by their actions at the crime scene. They cannot be exonerated because they have not yet taken the goods away from the store. But, it can be established that the intent exists merely by their presence at the crime scene at such an hour of the morning.
Answer: First, courts will examine the statutory authority for an agency's action and will invalidate agency choices that exceed these limits. In addition, a court may examine an agency's discretionary decisions, or discrete actions with legal consequences for the public.
Answer:
Explanation:
i don't know maybe paparazzi's because its considered stalking and photographing people without their consent.
Answer: D
Explanation:
Im not sure but i think thats the answer
Answer:
Put simply, a criminal conspiracy is an agreement to commit an unlawful act. The agreement itself is the crime, but at least one co-conspirator must take an “overt act” in furtherance of the conspiracy. Under the federal conspiracy statute: The agreement by two or more persons is the essence of the crime.
Explanation:
Our question is this: What makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as (or as deputies of) law-enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons we explain, does not settle questions of permissibility and culpability. We explain, compare, and contrast two existing definitions of legal entrapment to commit a crime that possess this neutrality. We point out some problems with the extensional correctness of these definitions and propose a new definition that resolves these problems. We then extend our definition to provide a more general definition of entrapment, encompassing both civil and legal cases. Our definition is, we believe, closer to being extensionally correct and will, we hope, provide a clearer basis for future discussions about the ethics of entrapment than do the definitions upon which it improves.
