Suppose the market for computer chips is dominated by two firms: Intel and AMD. Intel has discovered how to make superior chips
and is considering whether or not to adopt the new technology. Adoption would entail a fixed setup cost of C but would increase revenues. However, if Intel adopts the new technology, AMD can easily copy it at a lower setup cost of C/2. If Intel adopts and AMD does not, Intel would earn $20 in revenues while AMD would earn $0. If Intel adopts and AMD does likewise, each firm will earn $15 in revenues. If Intel does not adopt the new technology, it will earn $5 and AMD will earn $2. a. Write this game in extensive form. b. Under what conditions (i.e., for what values of C) does AMD have an incentive to adopt the new technology if Intel introduces it
1 answer:
Answer:
Explanation:
See the figure below.
b. AMD's payoff from adopting must exceed its payoff from not adopting. This is true if 15 - C/2 > 0. Solving for C, we find that AMD has an incentive to adopt if Intel adopts whenever C < 30.
c. No. When C = 12, AMD's best strategy is to adopt if Intel adopts, which means Intel would earn only 3by adopting. By not adopting, Intel can earn a payoff of 5; Intel's best option is not to adopt. This is the only Nash equilibrium, and it is also a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
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