The answer is thanksgiving.
D. <span>They provided the ideas of natural rights, government by consent, and separation of powers, which promote the greatest possible liberty for the people.
Think about it- none of the other answers make sense with the way our country is today.</span>
Answer:
The opening shots of the French Revolution in 1789 were treated with a mixture of horror and optimism in Britain. The downfall of the absolute monarchy in France was initially welcomed by some political figures. Some like Edmund Burke believed that a wave of reform would sweep across Europe, with long-overdue political reform in Britain following in its wake.
Burke later revised his attitudes to the revolution, however, claiming that the stability of the British constitution and her hard-won libertarian principles represented a more stable bedrock on which parliamentary reform should be built. Burke’s rejection of the bloodshed in France was later published in his Reflections on the Revolution in France which sparked a fierce debate during the 1790s regarding the outcome of the Reign of Terror across the channel. Though many political groups continued to take inspiration from the actions of the sans-culottes, others like Burke predicted chaos and turmoil should Britain follow a similar revolutionary route. Such responses resulted in strict measures imposed by Prime Minister William Pitt in the 1790s, designed to stem any criticism of the government and to curb the activities of political radicals.
Answer:
The red Army learning from their own mistakes
the vast improvement, training for officers and men was design to encourage greater initiative and technology available was hastily modernized
Allowing the army to profit from the reform of operational practice.
Explanation:
The transformation in Soviet fighting power and morale has a number of explanations. In the first place the Red Army learned a great deal from German practice and from their own mistakes.
The air and tank armies were reorganized to mimic the German Panzer divisions and air fleets; communication and intelligence were vastly improved (helped by a huge supply of American and British telephone equipment and cable); training for officers and men was designed to encourage greater initiative; and the technology available was hastily modernized to match German.
Two other changes proved vital to allow the army to profit from the reform of operational practice. First, Soviet industry and workforce proved remarkable adaptable for a command economy long regarded as inherently inefficient and inflexible.
The pre-war experience of economic planning and mobilization helped the regime to run a war economy on an emergency basis, while the vast exodus of workers (an estimated 16 million) and factories (more than 2,500 major plants) from in front of the advancing Germans allowed the USSR to reconstruct its armaments economy in central and eastern Russia with great rapidity.
The second factor lay with politics. Until the summer of 1942 Stalin and the Party closely controlled the Red Army. Political commissars worked directly alongside senior officers and reported straight back to the Kremlin. Stalin came to realize that political control was a dead hand on the army and cut it back sharply in the autumn of 1942
