Answer:
d. There are allocation trade-offs between fecundity and other traits.
Explanation:
for lower-than-expected fecundity , despite increased fitness is plausible because there are allocation fecundity and other traits.
Fecundity is nothing but the ability of an organism to produce and abundance of off-spring. It is same as fertility. Fecundity also depends upon size of the organism. This is called allocation fecundity.
Hence, option d is correct.
What motives producers to either <span>enter or leave the market is the prices and the willing for choice
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Egypt's fertile soil historically is largely a result of the Nile River and the sediment that the river deposits along its banks during flood seasons and also in its delta year round. This has been changed dramatically since the building of the Aswan Dam.
One of the results of the increase in the older population of the united states is a future problem for the Social Security system.
<h3>What population of the United States is referred to as the older population?</h3>
This is the term that is used to refer to the people in the society that are at the stage and the age of retirement in the nation. These people are of the age 65 and above. The social security system is done in such as way that the people would be able to receive the social security benefits.
Hence we can say that One of the results of the increase in the older population of the united states is a future problem for the Social Security system.
Read more on the social security system here: brainly.com/question/1156607
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Explanation:
The Islamic State (ISIS) is in sharp decline, but in its rout lie important lessons and lingering threats. This is true for the four countries of the Maghreb covered in this report, Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, which constitute a microcosm of ISIS’ identity, trajectory and shifting fortunes to date. Those countries possess two unwanted claims to fame: as a significant pool of ISIS foreign fighters and, in the case of Libya, as the site of ISIS’ first successful territorial conquest outside of Iraq and Syria. The pool is drying up, to a point, and the caliphate’s Libyan province is no more. But many factors that enabled ISIS’s ascent persist. While explaining the reasons for ISIS’ performance in different theatres is inexact and risky science, there seems little question that ending Libya’s anarchy and fragmentation; improving states’ capacities to channel anger at elites’ predatory behaviour and provide responsive governance; treading carefully when seeking to regiment religious discourse; and improving regional and international counter-terrorism cooperation would go a long way toward ensuring that success against ISIS is more than a fleeting moment.
Its operations in the Maghreb showcase ISIS’s three principal functions: as a recruitment agency for militants willing to fight for its caliphate in Iraq and Syria; as a terrorist group mounting bloody attacks against civilians; and as a military organisation seeking to exert territorial control and governance functions. In this sense, and while ISIS does not consider the Maghreb its main arena for any of those three forms of activity, how it performed in the region, and how states reacted to its rise, tells us a lot about the organisation.
