To calculate for the approximate market potential, we
simply have to take the ratio of the current market demand over the market
development index in fraction. That is:
market potential = 320 million / 0.55
<span>market potential = 582 million</span>
Back in 2015, McDonald’s was struggling. In Europe, sales were down 1.4% across the previous 6 years; 3.3% down in the US and almost 10% down across Africa and the Middle East. There were a myriad of challenges to overcome. Rising expectations of customer experience, new standards of convenience, weak in-store technology, a sprawling menu, a PR-bruised brand and questionable ingredients to name but a few.
McDonald’s are the original fast-food innovators; creating a level of standardisation that is quite frankly, remarkable. Buy a Big Mac in Beijing and it’ll taste the same as in Stratford-Upon Avon.
So when you’ve optimised product delivery, supply chain and flavour experience to such an incredible degree — how do you increase bottom line growth? It’s not going to come from making the Big Mac cheaper to produce — you’ve already turned those stones over (multiple times).
The answer of course, is to drive purchase frequency and increase margins through new products.
Numerous studies have shown that no matter what options are available, people tend to stick with the default options and choices they’ve made habitually. This is even more true when someone faces a broad selection of choices. We try to mitigate the risk of buyers remorse by sticking with the choices we know are ‘safe’.
McDonald’s has a uniquely pervasive presence in modern life with many of us having developed a pattern of ordering behaviour over the course of our lives (from Happy Meals to hangover cures). This creates a unique, and less cited, challenge for McDonald’s’ reinvention: how do you break people out of the default buying behaviours they’ve developed over decades?
In its simplest sense, the new format is designed to improve customer experience, which will in turn drive frequency and a shift in buying behaviour (for some) towards higher margin items. The most important shift in buying patterns is to drive reappraisal of the Signature range to make sure they maximise potential spend from those customers who can afford, and want, a more premium experience.
I hope this was helpful
Answer: $3000
Explanation: Allowance for doubtful accounts is the contra account to accounts receiveable when all the bad debts need to be accounted for. The bad debts reduces the accounts receivable line but all bad debts are actually deducted from the allowance for doubtful accounts.
The allowance for doubtful accounts for that year is calculated as 5% of the accounts receivable balance. This amounts to $8000 (160000 x 5%) before bad debts have been accounted for. Allowance for doubtful accounts moves in the opposite direction as accounts receivable because it is a contra account to this line item. At the end of the year before year end closing entries are done, and after the bad debts have been accounted for, the balance on the allowance for doubtful accounts is $5000.
This means that bad debts for that year is:
8000 (balance before bad debts have been accounted for)
- 5000 (balance after bad debts have been accounted for)
= $3000.
