Answer:
The number of tickets for sale at $26 should be 3300
The number of tickets for sale at $40 should be 1700
Step-by-step explanation:
Use 2 equations to represent the modifiers within the problem:
Now you want to find the point at which the variables are changed to make both equations correct, this can be done by graphing and finding the intersection of both lines.
Answer:
A = 1.5 π in² ≈ 4.7 in²
Step-by-step explanation:
the area (A) of the sector is calculated as
A = area of circle × fraction of circle
= πr² ×
= π × 3² ×
= 9π ×
= 1.5π in²
≈ 4.7 in² ( to the nearest tenth )
Answer:
a) attached below
b) ( T,T )
c) The Pure-strategy Nash equilibria are : ( N,E ) and ( E,N )
d) The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for Firm 1 = ( 1/3 , 0, 2/3 )
while the mixed -strategy Nash equilibrium for Firm 2 = ( 1/3 , 0, 2/3 )
Step-by-step explanation:
A) write down the game in matrix form
let: E = exit at the industry immediately
T = exit at the end of the quarter
N = exit at the end of the next quarter
matrix is attached below
B) weakly dominated strategies is ( T,T )
C) Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria
The Pure-strategy Nash equilibria are : ( N,E ) and ( E,N )
D ) Find the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for Firm 1 = ( 1/3 , 0, 2/3 )
while the mixed -strategy Nash equilibrium for Firm 2 = ( 1/3 , 0, 2/3 ) since T is weakly dominated then the mixed strategy will be NE
Assume that P is the probability of firm 1 exiting immediately ( E )
and q is the probability of firm 1 staying till next term ( N ) ∴ q = 1 - P.
hence the expected utility of firm 2 choosing E = 0 while the expected utility of choosing N = 4p - 2q .
The expected utilities of E and N to firm 2 =
0 = 4p - 2q = 4p - 2 ( 1-p) = 6p -2 which means : p = 1/3 , q = 2/3
