There are ___ different Bright Futures scholarships.

Mr. Boyd and Ms. Tuck decide to form a new corporation named BT Inc. Mr. Boyd transfers $10,000 cash and business inventory ($20

kicyunya [14]

Answer:

1. Mr Boyd's share = 400, Ms Tuck = 800

2. Mr Boyd's realised gain = $16,800, recognized gain = $0, basis = $13200

Ms Tuck's realized gain = $18500, gain recognized = 0, basis = $41500

Explanation:

1.

Total share = $1200

Cash received from Mr Boyd = 10000

FMV from him = 20000

Total value = 30000

FMV of equipment from Ms Tuck = 60000

Total value from both of them = 60000 + 30000 = $90000

Number of share Mr Boyd is to receive = 1200x(30000/90000)

= 400

Number of share Ms Tuck is to receive

= 1200x(60000/90000)

= 800

2.

<u>Mr Boyd's gains</u>

Cash received = 10000

FMV = 20000

Total = 30000

Adjusted basis = 3200

Total tax basis = 10000+3200

Gain realized = 30000-13200

= 16800

Gain realized = 0 because it is a non taxable exchange.

Mr Boyd's realised gain = $16800, recognised gain = $0, basis = $13200

<u>Ms Tuck</u>

FMV = 60000

Adjusted tax basis = 41500

Gain realized = 60000-41500

= 18500

Gain recognized = 0(non taxable exchange)

Ms Tuck's realized gain = $18500, recognized gain = $0, basis = $41500

3

the FMV basis of inventory = 20000

carryover basis = 3200

equipment basis FMV = 60000

carryover basis = 41500

note that no gain if equal to or more than 80 percent of the ownership of the stock in a non taxable exchange.

6 0

3 years ago

You are the manager of a firm that manufactures front and rear windshields for the automobile industry. Due to economies of scal

Leya [2.2K]

Answer:

a. The optimal pricing strategy will be one-shot Nash equilibrium in which “You” charge low price, “Your Rival” charge low price and then the payoff is ($0, $0)

b. Yes, the anwer will differ becuase it is not possible to sustain the collusive outcome as a Nash equilibrium because $\pi ^{Cheat}$ > $\pi ^{Cooperate}$ .

Explanation:

a. Determine your optimal pricing strategy if you and your rival believe that the new Highlander is a "special edition" that will be sold only for one year.

Note: See the attached excel file for the Representation of one shot normal for of the game played between "You" and "Your Rival" together with the payoffs.

From the attached excel file, the dominant strategy is for “You” and “Your Rival” to charge “Low Price” each. If the dominant strategy is played by “You” and “Your Rival”, the optimal pricing strategy will be one-shot Nash equilibrium in which “You” charge low price, “Your Rival” charge low price and then the payoff is ($0, $0).

b. Would your answer differ if you and your rival were required to resubmit price quotes year after year and if, in any given year, there was a 60 percent chance that Toyota would discontinue the Highlander? Explain.

When we have a year-after-year competition between “You” and “Your Rival” but with a 60 percent chance that Toyota would discontinue the Highlander, the payoffs of the firm that continue to comply with the collusive strategy of charging “High Price” by each firm under the normal trigger strategy whereby “You” and “Your Rival” agree to charge high price as long as there is no past deviation by any of the firm, otherwise charge a low price is as follows:

$\pi ^{Cooperate}$ = $6 + $6(100% - 60%) + $6(100% - 60%)^2 + 6(100% - 60%)^2 …….

$\pi ^{Cooperate}$ = $6 / 6% = $10

Therefore, what the firm that cheats earn today is $11 million and it earns $0 forever. The implication of this is that $\pi ^{Cheat}$ = $11

Therefore, the anwer will differ becuase it is not possible to sustain the collusive outcome as a Nash equilibrium because $\pi ^{Cheat}$ > $\pi ^{Cooperate}$ .

Download xlsx

7 0

2 years ago

What information is the buyer entitled to?

erastovalidia [21]

Answer:

notbuiseness

Explanation:

7 0

2 years ago

Problems and applications q6 darnell loves playing rock 'n' roll music at high volume. jacques loves opera and hates rock 'n' ro

mafiozo [28]

Answer:

false

Explanation:

The Coase theorem states that parties in dispute should seek an optimal solution to their problem regardless of how property rights were initially distributed.

In this case, you need to find an agreement that satisfies both Darnell and Jacques regardless of who initially would have been considered to be right about the argument. Conflicts over rights to use property can be solved when parties settle on the efficient use of inputs. E.g. they could establish hours at which Darnell can listen to rock n' roll, and other hours when he shouldn't. That way both of them can enjoy the music they like and not bother the neighbors.

An optimal solution can always be reached regardless of initial distribution of rights.

7 0

3 years ago

Good Morning people how are you guys doin

il63 [147K]

Answer:

We are doing wonderful what aboit you

4 0

2 years ago