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Answer all five questions below

Svetach [21]

Answer:

use a calculator

Step-by-step explanation:

there for question b

6 0

3 years ago

What is StartFraction 4 Over 5 EndFraction divided by one-third A fraction bar. The top bar is labeled 1. 3 bars underneath the

Vladimir79 [104]

Answer:

2 2/5

Step-by-step explanation:

Given 4/5÷1/3

Multiply 4/5 with the reciprocal of 1/3 as shown;

= 4/5 × 1/(1/3)

= 4/5 × 3/1

= 12/5

= 2 2/5

The quotient is 2 2/5

4 0

3 years ago

Read 2 more answers

Find the sum or difference. a. -121 2 + 41 2 b. -0.35 - (-0.25)

s344n2d4d5 [400]

Answer:

2

Step-by-step explanation:

The reason an infinite sum like 1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + · · · can have a definite value is that one is really looking at the sequence of numbers

1

1 + 1/2 = 3/2

1 + 1/2 + 1/4 = 7/4

1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 = 15/8

etc.,

and this sequence of numbers (1, 3/2, 7/4, 15/8, . . . ) is converging to a limit. It is this limit which we call the "value" of the infinite sum.

How do we find this value?

If we assume it exists and just want to find what it is, let's call it S. Now

S = 1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + · · ·

so, if we multiply it by 1/2, we get

(1/2) S = 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + · · ·

Now, if we subtract the second equation from the first, the 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, etc. all cancel, and we get S - (1/2)S = 1 which means S/2 = 1 and so S = 2.

This same technique can be used to find the sum of any "geometric series", that it, a series where each term is some number r times the previous term. If the first term is a, then the series is

S = a + a r + a r^2 + a r^3 + · · ·

so, multiplying both sides by r,

r S = a r + a r^2 + a r^3 + a r^4 + · · ·

and, subtracting the second equation from the first, you get S - r S = a which you can solve to get S = a/(1-r). Your example was the case a = 1, r = 1/2.

In using this technique, we have assumed that the infinite sum exists, then found the value. But we can also use it to tell whether the sum exists or not: if you look at the finite sum

S = a + a r + a r^2 + a r^3 + · · · + a r^n

then multiply by r to get

rS = a r + a r^2 + a r^3 + a r^4 + · · · + a r^(n+1)

and subtract the second from the first, the terms a r, a r^2, . . . , a r^n all cancel and you are left with S - r S = a - a r^(n+1), so

(IMAGE)

As long as |r| < 1, the term r^(n+1) will go to zero as n goes to infinity, so the finite sum S will approach a / (1-r) as n goes to infinity. Thus the value of the infinite sum is a / (1-r), and this also proves that the infinite sum exists, as long as |r| < 1.

In your example, the finite sums were

1 = 2 - 1/1

3/2 = 2 - 1/2

7/4 = 2 - 1/4

15/8 = 2 - 1/8

and so on; the nth finite sum is 2 - 1/2^n. This converges to 2 as n goes to infinity, so 2 is the value of the infinite sum.

8 0

3 years ago

Please help with math

jeka94

What would you need help with?

4 0

3 years ago

Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably. Each firm has three possible cho

yaroslaw [1]

Answer:

a) attached below

b) ( T,T )

c) The Pure-strategy Nash equilibria are : ( N,E ) and ( E,N )

d) The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for Firm 1 = ( 1/3 , 0, 2/3 )

while the mixed -strategy Nash equilibrium for Firm 2 = ( 1/3 , 0, 2/3 )

Step-by-step explanation:

A) write down the game in matrix form

let: E = exit at the industry immediately

T = exit at the end of the quarter

N = exit at the end of the next quarter

matrix is attached below

B) weakly dominated strategies is ( T,T )

C) Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria

The Pure-strategy Nash equilibria are : ( N,E ) and ( E,N )

D ) Find the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium

The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for Firm 1 = ( 1/3 , 0, 2/3 )

while the mixed -strategy Nash equilibrium for Firm 2 = ( 1/3 , 0, 2/3 ) since T is weakly dominated then the mixed strategy will be NE

Assume that P is the probability of firm 1 exiting immediately ( E )

and q is the probability of firm 1 staying till next term ( N ) ∴ q = 1 - P.

hence the expected utility of firm 2 choosing E = 0 while the expected utility of choosing N = 4p - 2q .

The expected utilities of E and N to firm 2 =

0 = 4p - 2q = 4p - 2 ( 1-p) = 6p -2 which means : p = 1/3 , q = 2/3

4 0

3 years ago