<span>The domino theory, which governed much of U.S. foreign policy beginning in the early 1950s, held that a communist victory in one nation would quickly lead to a chain reaction of communist takeovers in neighboring states. In Southeast Asia, the United States government used the domino theory to justify its support of a non-communist regime in South Vietnam against the communist government of North Vietnam, and ultimately its increasing involvement in the long-running Vietnam War (1954-75). In fact, the American failure to prevent a communist victory in Vietnam had much less of a global impact than had been assumed by the domino theory. Though communist regimes did arise in Laos and Cambodia after 1975, communism failed to spread throughout the rest of Southeast Asia. I hope this was of help. </span>
Most of the fighting had taken place in the south, and this left the economy and cattle industry in ruins. Herds had been left un-managed during the war and had become half-wild by the time it had ended. Furthermore, the ruined economy meant there was little demand for expensive beef.
