To be honest all of these answers are wrong (for being the main reason)
<span>When in 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria, Great Britain and France, the only League members at the time with significant regional ‘clout’, proved unwilling and would perhaps in any case have been unable to impose effective sanctions on the aggressor. Next, in 1935, Italy invaded Abyssinia in whose fate no other great power had any direct interest. This, it was widely recognised, was the decisive test case for the League. For Great Britain and France clearly did on this occasion have the capacity to defeat Italy if matters came to an all-out war. But in neither London nor Paris was there sufficient support for the imposition of anything more vigorous than partial economic sanctions (which themselves were lifted in 1936). The British cabinet was satisfied that they could not risk the loss of even part of their fleet in a war with Italy at a time when their possessions in the Far East were thought to be menaced by Japan and when the US administration was seen to be hamstrung by congressional neutrality legislation. Similarly, the French held that war with Italy for the sake of Abyssinia would be quixotic at a time when all French forces were thought to be needed for a possible early showdown with Nazi Germany. Abyssinia was accordingly incorporated into the Italian empire in 1936. As a body for resisting international aggression the League had thus effectively perished. It continued to exist in a moribund condition until the end of the Second World War when it was formally replaced by the United Nations. </span> If this is multiple choice then just go with B)
the sinking of the lusitania didn't directly cause the United states to enter the war. it did however fuel virulent ain't German sentiment in Britain and the United states and hinder diplomatic relations between Germany and the United states
