The Durham Act is NOT one of the acts that created more federal prisoners.
<u>Option: D</u>
<u>Explanation:</u>
The problems addressed was left open by the 1938 Act named as amendment Durham-Humphrey, passed in 1951. It generated two drug courses: The prescription i.e Rx legend and OTC i.e over the counter.
Before this amendment was passed, the drug makers were usually free to decide which classification their drug resided to. This modification differentiated between the so named legendary (prescription) drugs and counter (non-prescription) drugs. The alteration also allowed the oral instead of written acceptance of prescriptions and the refilling of prescriptions.
I have no idea I’m doing this so I can get points to ask my own question
Answer:
D.
Explanation:
Power Distance is a tool developed by a Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede.
Power Distance is a tool used to see how people of a particular culture views the power relationships. Power relationships include people who are in power and not. In this people who are not in power accept the unequal distribution of power.
The power distance in the US is comparatively low than Japan. In Japan, people are more conscious of power relation than in the US and follows hierarchy.
So, the correct answer is option D.
Answer:
596 parking spaces
Explanation:
The total of parking spaces is the sum of the parking spaces of each row, whit the 20 and 21 from the first and second row you have:
And the information of the other 15 rows must be calculated: the third row has , and the fourth . If we write the number of parking spaces in the fourth row in a way that the number 21 remains, we will have 21+4=25, and the 4 is the 2 added for each row multiplied by two rows so:
Her is the number of parking spaces and the number of row after the second row, in other words, is the third row. THe addition of the numbers of each row is:
Using the formula:
Answer:
You’d be hard pressed to find someone who would disagree that American politics are highly partisan. Partisanship has been on the rise since the 1970s, and the consensus among the media seems to be that political polarization has skyrocketed since the beginning of the campaign season for the 2016 presidential election.
But a new study from the Annenberg School for Communication does not support this popular belief. Professor Yphtach Lelkes and his research collaborators conducted a series of studies in 2014 and then replicated these studies in 2017, allowing them to compare levels of political polarization in America before and after Donald Trump was elected president. They found no increase in polarization, leading them to conclude that Trump has not made things worse.
“I’ve been studying polarization for a long time,” Lelkes says, “and elite discourse is arguably at its worst, which led us to theorize that partisanship would be worse since Trump took office. But we found that things really have not budged.”
The first of the three studies tested participants’ willingness to speak poorly of the other political party and their opposition of speech critical of their own party. The second study tested the extent to which participants desired to avoid members of the opposite party, even when participating in activities that were not related to politics. And the third study tested participants’ willingness to commit or condone intentional actions designed to harm members of the opposing party.
These studies certainly indicate that America is politically polarized — evidenced by a preference for media critical of the other party rather than one’s own, among other things — but the findings show no statistical difference between the levels of partisanship in 2014 and 2017. America is no doubt polarized; just not more so than it was before Trump entered the political arena.
“Trump is a symptom of polarization rather than a cause of it,” says Lelkes. “People voted for him because of the highly polarized environment we already lived in; he didn’t create that environment.”
In fact, Lelkes’ findings actually indicate that there’s been a decrease in how positively Americans feel about their own party. Regular Americans are seemingly dissatisfied with both the party they identify with and the party they don’t identify with. And as elites — like policymakers and media personalities — become increasingly extreme and partisan, those regular Americans might decide they don’t want anything to do with either party, or with politics in general.
Explanation: