Crosby signs a contract with Subban and agrees to meet at Subban's business at the conclusion of each work day, before the first payment is due, and then files a lawsuit against Subban, claiming that the license is unenforceable because the license's objective is to protect the public.
<h3>What is contract?</h3>
A contract is the legal agreement between the two parties. It contains all the essentials of section 10. On the breach of such contract, the party who break the contract will be punishable under the act.
Crosby and Subban have a contract in which Crosby agrees to sweep Subban's retail store at the end of each work day. Subban discovers Crosby is unlicensed before the first payment is due.
All retail floor sweepers in Florida are required to be certified and pay annual dues.
As a result, Subban does not compensate Crosby for his efforts. When Crosby s pursues a breach of contract complaint against Subban to court, the judge will conclude the contract is invalid since the purpose of the license is to protect the public.
Therefore, the contract is unenforceable.
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Just think here itll come to you eventually
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It is called A COST DRIVER. A cost driver refers to any factor that causes a change in the cost of an activity. Cost driver is used to assign overhead costs to the quantity of a particular goods that is manufactured. Example of a cost driver is direct labour hours input into a production operation.
Answer:
Option "A" is the correct answer to the following question.
Explanation:
A non compete agreement is a type of deal under which an employee signs a document that states that the employee will neither leave the company nor join any of the companies or businesses Which can harm its employer in the competitive market. Such an agreement is made a non-compete agreement.
Such legal arrangements prohibit workers from joining industries or occupations which are considered directly competitive with the employer.
International business research is only beginning to develop theory and evidence highlighting the importance of supranational regional institutions to explain firm internationalization. In this context, we offer new theory and evidence regarding the effect of a region's "institutional complexity" on foreign direct investment decisions by multinational enterprises (MNEs). We define a region's institutional complexity using two components, regional institutional diversity and number of countries. We explore the unique relationships of both components with MNEs' decisions to internationalize into countries within the region. Drawing on semiglobalization and regionalization research and institutional theory, we posit an inverted U-shaped relationship between a region's institutional diversity and MNE internationalization: extremely low or high regional institutional diversity has negative effects on internationalization, but moderate diversity has a positive effect on internationalization. Larger numbers of countries within the region reduces MNE internationalization in a linear fashion. We find support for these predicted relationships in multilevel analyses of 698 Japanese MNEs operating in 49 countries within 9 regions. Regional institutional complexity is both a challenge and an opportunity for MNEs seeking advantages through the aggregation and arbitrage of individual country factors.
