Answer:
d. 5.08%
Explanation:
We have to first calculate the YTM of the bond, and then apply the tax shield.
To get the YTM we have to calculate the rate of return of an annuity of 46.25 for 20 years compounding semiannually at IRR rate and the present value of the face value redeem in 20 years.
IRR = 0.084656891 (it should be done using financial calculator or excel or a similar software program)
then we apply the shield tax to the IRR:
IRR x (1 - tax-rate) = Cost of debt
0.084656891 * ( 1 - 0.4) = 5.0794= 5.08
Answer:
the correct answer is finances
Answer:
product B
Explanation:
The computation is shown below;
<u>Particulars Product A Product B Product C
</u>
Selling Price $5.00 $3.00 $5.00
Less: Variable cost per unit ($3.50) ($2.00) ($2.00)
Contribution per unit $1.50 $1.00 $3.00
Machine hours per unit 0.75 0.25 1
Contribution per machine hour $2.00 $4.00 $3.00
($1.50 ÷ 0.75) ($1.00 ÷ 0.25) ($3.00 ÷ 1)
The product B should be produced as it has the highest contribution per machine hour
Answer:Allocated MOH= $16
Explanation:
Giving the following information:
teller transaction processing ($2.80 per teller transaction)
check processing ($0.25 per canceled check)
ATM transaction processing ($0.20 per ATM transaction).
<u>To allocate overhead, we need to use the following formula:</u>
Allocated MOH= Estimated manufacturing overhead rate* Actual amount of allocation base
Allocated MOH= 2.8*4 + 0.25*12 + 0.2*9
Allocated MOH= $16
Answer:
false
Explanation:
The Coase theorem states that parties in dispute should seek an optimal solution to their problem regardless of how property rights were initially distributed.
In this case, you need to find an agreement that satisfies both Darnell and Jacques regardless of who initially would have been considered to be right about the argument. Conflicts over rights to use property can be solved when parties settle on the efficient use of inputs. E.g. they could establish hours at which Darnell can listen to rock n' roll, and other hours when he shouldn't. That way both of them can enjoy the music they like and not bother the neighbors.
An optimal solution can always be reached regardless of initial distribution of rights.
