Answer:
The Treaty Of Paris ended the spanish-American War.
Explanation:
Answer:
1. Arrest: This is the process of restraining or apprehending a person (usually a suspect) for an investigation.
2. Indictment: After an arrest, a formal charge is drafted stating the alleged offence that the arrested suspect has committed. It is the charge or the alleged offence that is regarded as an indictment.
3. Arraignment and plea: This refers to the procedure where the accused person/defendant is brought before the court and the charge is read to him in the language that he understands, after which he takes his plea (whether guilty or not guilty).
4. Appearance before a judge: After arraignment and taking of plea the accused person/defendant is then brought before a judge, usually represented by a legal practitioner.
5. Trial: This is the process or stage of criminal procedure where the case of the parties are argued before the court, witnesses are called, and evidence is presented before the court.
6. Verdict and Sentencing: After due evaluation of the case presented before the court and the evidence tendered, the court will make its findings and pronounce its verdict or judgment on the matter based on its findings on a considered weighting of credible evidence. After which, If the accused person/defendant is found guilty, the the court will sentence the accused person by imposing the punishment prescribed by law on such person.
7. Appeal: This is the process whereby a person who is unsatisfied with the verdict or judgment of the court, brings an application before an appellate court to have the earlier judgment set aside or varied.
Hello There.
Your answer is going to be A.
Hope this helped.
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Question- Why did the Constitution allow Slavery?
Answer- On Monday, Senator Bernie Sanders told his audience at Liberty University that the United States “in many ways was created” as a nation “from way back on racist principles.” Not everyone agreed. The historian Sean Wilentz took to The New York Times to write that Bernie Sanders—and a lot of his colleagues—have it all wrong about the founding of the United States. The Constitution that protected slavery for three generations, until a devastating war and a constitutional amendment changed the game, was actually antislavery because it didn’t explicitly recognize “property in humans.” Lincoln certainly said so, and cited the same passage from Madison’s notes that Wilentz used. But does that make it so? And does it gainsay Sanders’s inelegant but apparently necessary voicing of what ought to be obvious, what David Brion Davis, Wilentz’s scholarly mentor and my own, wrote back in 1966—that the nation was “in many ways” founded on racial slavery? If the absence of an ironclad guarantee of a right to property in men really “quashed” the slaveholders, it should be apparent in the rest of the document, by which the nation was actually governed. But of the 11 clauses in the Constitution that deal with or have policy implications for slavery, 10 protect slave property and the powers of masters. Only one, the international slave-trade clause, points to a possible future power by which, after 20 years, slavery might be curtailed—and it didn’t work out that way at all. The three-fifths clause, which states that three-fifths of “all other persons” (i.e. slaves) will be counted for both taxation and representation, was a major boon to the slave states. This is well known; it’s astounding to see Wilentz try to pooh-pooh it. No, it wasn’t counting five-fifths, but counting 60 percent of slaves added enormously to slave-state power in the formative years of the republic. By 1800, northern critics called this phenomenon “the slave power” and called for its repeal. With the aid of the second article of the Constitution, which numbered presidential electors by adding the number of representatives in the House to the number of senators, the three-fifths clause enabled the elections of plantation masters Jefferson in 1800 and Polk in 1844. Just as importantly, the tax liability for three-fifths of the slaves turned out to mean nothing. Sure the federal government could pass a head tax, but it almost never did. It hardly could when the taxes had to emerge from the House, where the South was 60 percent overrepresented. So the South gained political power, without having to surrender much of anything in exchange. Indeed, all the powers delegated to the House—that is, the most democratic aspects of the Constitution—were disproportionately affected by what critics quickly came to call “slave representation.” These included the commerce clause—a compromise measure that gave the federal government power to regulate commerce, but only at the price of giving disproportionate power to slave states. And as if that wasn’t enough, Congress was forbidden from passing export duties—at a time when most of the value of what the U.S. exported lay in slave-grown commodities. This was one of the few things (in addition to regulating the slave trade for 20 years) that Congress was forbidden to do. Slavery and democracy in the U.S. were joined at the 60-percent-replaced hip. Another clause in Article I allowed Congress to mobilize “the Militia” to “suppress insurrections”—again, the House with its disproportionate votes would decide whether a slave rebellion counted as an insurrection. Wilentz repeats the old saw that with the rise of the northwest, the slave power’s real bastion was the Senate. Hence the battles over the admission of slave and free states that punctuated the path to Civil War. But this reads history backwards from the 1850s, not forward from 1787.
