I'm have a little trouble figuring it out.
2 answers:
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Answer:
- Part (a) Vertex = (-3, -1)
- Part (b) Vertex = (4, 5)
- Part (c) function 2; max value = 5
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Explanations:
Part (a)
In this case, the vertex is the highest point, so the vertex of function 1 is (-3, -1)
If the parabola was flipped so that it opened upward, instead of downward, then the vertex would be the lowest point.
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Part (b)
We could graph this function to see where the highest or lowest point is, but there's another way we could find the vertex using algebra.
The given equation is in the form y = ax^2 + bx + c where in this case
- a = -2
- b = 16
- c = -27
The a and b values are plugged into the formula below to get
h = -b/(2a)
h = -16/(2*(-2))
h = -16/(-4)
h = 4
This is the x coordinate the vertex since the vertex is (h,k)
To find k, we plug that value of h into the original function to find its corresponding y value.
y = -2x^2 + 16x - 27
y = -2(4)^2 + 16(4) - 27
y = -2(16) + 16(4) - 27
y = -32 + 64 - 27
y = 5
We found that h = 4 leads to k = 5. The vertex is (h,k) = (4, 5)
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Part (c)
We'll compare the y values of each vertex
- Function 1 has a vertex of (-3, 1)
- Function 2 has a vertex of (4, 5)
The vertex with the larger y value is the winner, so that would be function 2. This parabola reaches a higher peak compared to the other curve.
The max value here is y = 5. In other words, it's the maximum output the function can produce.
If you graphed functions 1 and 2 together on the same xy grid (see below), you'll see that the curve for function 2 reaches a higher peak.
Answer:
a) attached below
b) ( T,T )
c) The Pure-strategy Nash equilibria are : ( N,E ) and ( E,N )
d) The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for Firm 1 = ( 1/3 , 0, 2/3 )
while the mixed -strategy Nash equilibrium for Firm 2 = ( 1/3 , 0, 2/3 )
Step-by-step explanation:
A) write down the game in matrix form
let: E = exit at the industry immediately
T = exit at the end of the quarter
N = exit at the end of the next quarter
matrix is attached below
B) weakly dominated strategies is ( T,T )
C) Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria
The Pure-strategy Nash equilibria are : ( N,E ) and ( E,N )
D ) Find the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for Firm 1 = ( 1/3 , 0, 2/3 )
while the mixed -strategy Nash equilibrium for Firm 2 = ( 1/3 , 0, 2/3 ) since T is weakly dominated then the mixed strategy will be NE
Assume that P is the probability of firm 1 exiting immediately ( E )
and q is the probability of firm 1 staying till next term ( N ) ∴ q = 1 - P.
hence the expected utility of firm 2 choosing E = 0 while the expected utility of choosing N = 4p - 2q .
The expected utilities of E and N to firm 2 =
0 = 4p - 2q = 4p - 2 ( 1-p) = 6p -2 which means : p = 1/3 , q = 2/3
