Answer:
Overconfidence.
Explanation:
This question is missing its options. The options for this question are:
Dual Processing,
The I-knew-it-all-along phenomenon,
Hindsight Bias, OR
Overconfidence
In psychology, the overconfidence effect refers to a bias in which a person's subjective confidence in his/her judgements or abilities is greater than how they actually are. In other words, we think our skills or talents are better than they actually are.
In this example, at the beginning of the school year, the students were asked to predict a variety of their own social behaviors and they reported being 84% assured in their self-predictions. However, their predictions were only correct 71% of the time. We can see that <u>their judgements about their social behaviors (or the confidence on them) were greater than how they actually were</u>. Therefore, this would be an example of Overconfidence.
The War We Could Have Won
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WASHINGTON - THE Vietnam War is universally regarded as a disaster for what it did to the American and Vietnamese people. However, 30 years after the war's end, the reasons for its outcome remain a matter of dispute.
The most popular explanation among historians and journalists is that the defeat was a result of American policy makers' cold-war-driven misunderstanding of North Vietnam's leaders as dangerous Communists. In truth, they argue, we were fighting a nationalist movement with great popular support. In this view, "our side," South Vietnam, was a creation of foreigners and led by a corrupt urban elite with no popular roots. Hence it could never prevail, not even with a half-million American troops, making the war "unwinnable."
This simple explanation is repudiated by powerful historical evidence, both old and new. Its proponents mistakenly base their conclusions on the situation in Vietnam during the 1950's and early 1960's and ignore the changing course of the war (notably, the increasing success of President Richard Nixon's Vietnamization strategy) and the evolution of South Vietnamese society (in particular the introduction of agrarian reforms).
For all the claims of popular support for the Vietcong insurgency, far more South Vietnamese peasants fought on the side of Saigon than on the side of Hanoi. The Vietcong were basically defeated by the beginning of 1972, which is why the North Vietnamese launched a huge conventional offensive at the end of March that year. During the Easter Offensive of 1972 -- at the time the biggest campaign of the war -- the South Vietnamese Army was able to hold onto every one of the 44 provincial capitals except Quang Tri, which it regained a few months later. The South Vietnamese relied on American air support during that offensive.
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If the United States had provided that level of support in 1975, when South Vietnam collapsed in the face of another North Vietnamese offensive, the outcome might have been at least the same as in 1972. But intense lobbying of Congress by the antiwar movement, especially in the context of the Watergate scandal, helped to drive cutbacks of American aid in 1974. Combined with the impact of the world oil crisis and inflation of 1973-74, the results were devastating for the south. As the triumphant North Vietnamese commander, Gen. Van Tien Dung, wrote later, President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam was forced to fight "a poor man's war."
Even Hanoi's main patron, the Soviet Union, was convinced that a North Vietnamese military victory was highly unlikely. Evidence from Soviet Communist Party archives suggests that, until 1974, Soviet military intelligence analysts and diplomats never believed that the North Vietnamese would be victorious on the battlefield. Only political and diplomatic efforts could succeed. Moscow thought that the South Vietnamese government was strong enough to defend itself with a continuation of American logistical support. The former Soviet chargé d'affaires in Hanoi during the 1970's told me in Moscow in late 1993 that if one looked at the balance of forces, one could not predict that the South would be defeated. Until 1975, Moscow was not only impressed by American military power and political will, it also clearly had no desire to go to war with the United States over Vietnam. But after 1975, Soviet fear of the United States dissipated.
U.S. troops withdrew from the country. this is answer
From what I know, it’s just male supremacists who think women don’t have much part in society except to do housework and get abused by. It’s really bad.
Push and pull factors
A push factor is a when someone gets pushed out there country such as when war is in occurance or since there isn't enough land
A pull factor is when someone is drawn to the new place such as new jobs and land
The people of <u>Lebanon</u> are overwhelmingly Arab but are divided by religion.
