Question

In the envelope game, there are two players and two envelopes. One of the envelopes is marked ''player 1 " and the other is marked "player 2." At the beginning of the game, each envelope contains one dollar. Player 1 is given the choice between stopping the game and continuing. If he chooses to stop, then each player receives the money in his own envelope and the game ends. If player 1 chooses to continue, then a dollar is removed from his envelope and two dollars are added to player 2's envelope. Then player 2 must choose between stopping the game and continuing. If he stops, then the game ends and each player keeps the money in his own envelope. If player 2 elects to continue, then a dollar is removed from his envelope and two dollars are added to player 1 's envelope. Play continues like this, alternating between the players, until either one of them decides to stop or k rounds of play have elapsed. If neither player chooses to stop by the end of the kth round, then both players obtain zero. Assume players want to maximize the amount of money they earn.
(a) Draw this game's extensive-form tree for k = 5.

(b) Use backward induction to find the subgame perfect equilibrium.

(c) Describe the backward induction outcome of this game for any finite integer k.

Answer 1

Answer:

Step-by-step explanation:

a) The game tree for k = 5 has been drawn in the uploaded picture below where C stands for continuing and S stands for stopping:

b) Say we were to use backward induction we can clearly observe that stopping is optimal decision for each player in every round. Starting from last round, if player 1 stops he gets $3 otherwise zero if continues. Hence strategy S is optimal there.

Given this, player 2’s payoff to C is $3, while stopping yields $4, so second player will also chooses to stop. To which, player 1’s payoff in k = 3 from C is $1 and her payoff from S is $2, so she stops.

Given that, player 2 would stop in k = 2, which means that player 1 would stop also in k = 1.

The sub game perfect equilibrium is therefore the profile of strategies where both players always stop: (S, S, S) for player 1, and (S, S) for player 2.

c) Irrespective of whether both players would be better off if they could play the game for several rounds, neither can credibly commit to not stopping when given a chance, and so they both end up with small payoffs.

i hope this helps, cheers