Two players find themselves in a legal battle over a patent. The patent is worth 20 for each player, so the winner would receive
20 and the loser 0. Given the norms of the country they are in, it is common to bribe the judge of a case. Each player can secretly oer a bribe of 0, 9 or 20, and the one whose bribe is the largest is awarded the patent. If both choose not to bribe, or if the bribes are the same amount, then each has an equal chance of being awarded the patent. (If a player decides to bribe then the judge pockets it regardless of who gets the patent).
(a) Derive the game matrix.
(b) Is the game dominance solvable? If so, findnd the strategy prole surviving IDSDS.
(c) Now consider the case in which the allowed bribe amounts are instead 0, 9 and 15. Is the game dominance solvable? Find the best responses of each player to each of the pure strategies of the opponent.
(a) Derive the game matrix.
(b) Is the game dominance solvable? If so, findnd the strategy prole surviving IDSDS.
(c) Now consider the case in which the allowed bribe amounts are instead 0, 9 and 15. Is the game dominance solvable? Find the best responses of each player to each of the pure strategies of the opponent.
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